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Abstract
We utilize optimization methods to determine equilibria of cryptocur-
rencies. A core group, the wealthy, fears the loss of assets that can be
seized by a government. Volatility may be influenced by speculators. The
wealthy must divide their assets between the home currency and the cryp-
tocurrency, while the government decides the probability of seizing a frac-
tion the assets of this group. We establish conditions for existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibria. Also examined is the separate timescale
problem in which the government policy cannot be reversed, while the
wealthy can adjust their allocation in reaction to the government’s desig-
nation of probability.
Cryptocurrencies have evolved into a new speculative asset form that differs
from others in that most represent no intrinsic value; they cannot be redeemed
by a financial institution for any amount [1]. The roller-coaster ride of Bit-
coin prices1 from $6,000 to $20,000 back to $6,000, with bounces in between,
all during the period from October 2017 to July 2018, was shadowed by other
major cryptocurrencies [17]. This has been accompanied by the general feeling
in government, business and academia that the speculative fever is of concern
only to those who own the cryptocurrencies. There is some justification for
this perspective as the total market capitalization of all cryptocurrencies is now
only about $131 billion, so that large moves in the cryptocurrency price are
not likely to have a significant impact on the world’s stock and bond markets.
However, this impact will present a significant risk to the world’s markets if
the market capitalization of the cryptocurrencies increases significantly. Dur-
ing the dramatic round trip of Bitcoin between $6,000 to $20,000, the market
capitalization of all cryptocurrencies nearly doubled in six months. Moreover,
10,000 Bitcoins were used to purchase two pizzas in the first transaction in 2010
1In March 2019, Bitcoin hovered near $3,800.
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[32]. If people gradually become more comfortable with cryptocurrencies, as
they did with internet shopping, it is likely that the market capitalization could
grow to a few percent of the $75 trillion Gross World Product (GWP) as the
fraction of the world’s savings that is under threat by government seizure, high
inflation, etc., is certainly at least this fraction (as discussed further below). At
this point, large price changes in cryptocurrencies would likely have an impact
on the broader markets.
It is thus important to understand the factors behind the market capitaliza-
tion and price of cryptocurrencies. With all other assets there is some theoretical
methodology to determine the value, which is at least a first step estimating the
trading price. For example, the value of a stock is assessed by measures such
as the expected dividend stream (see Graham [21], [22], Luenberger [27], Bodie
et al. [4], and Wolpert et. al. [39]). Even beyond these calculations, a share-
holder is de facto part owner of a corporation, and shareholders can – and do
– collectively exercise their rights assured by law. By contrast, a typical cryp-
tocurrency does not assure the owner of any rights. Furthermore, there is no
corporate governance at all. The ”miners and developers” – whose names are
usually not disclosed – get together and decide essentially on the supply (e.g., by
introducing a related cryptocurrency that they term a ”fork”). Unlike corporate
actions in which shareholders can demand a vote, e.g., for directors via a proxy
battle, it is not even clear which, if any, nation’s laws apply. Thus, the absence
of an intrinsic value of a cryptocurrency means that the usual traditional finance
methods, such as those introduced by Graham ([21], [22]), are inapplicable.
Our analysis begins with a game theoretic examination of the motivations
of three groups that are the key players. For a core group, the basic need for a
cryptocurrency arises from the inadequacy of the home currency and banking
system [33]. There are also a significant number of people who are not able to
obtain a credit card or even open a bank account in the US, for example [38]. In
many countries, owning large amounts of the currency can present a significant
risk. There is the possibility of expropriation by the government, sometimes
in the guise of a corruption probe. The government could institute policies in
which inflation is very high, e.g., the extreme example in Venezuela [20] where
hyperinflation decimated any individual savings. Onerous taxes can be placed
by the government on the wealthy. Thus a group of people in the world have
rational reasons to replace their country’s currency with one that is outside the
control of their government or financial institutions, even if it presents some risk.
Once it is transferred to cryptocurrency, they would have the option of buying
a more reliable currency or asset in another country. We denote this group by
W (the ”wealthy”). Returning to the point made above, there is a substantial
amount of the world’s wealth (including individual’s whose assets are not large)
that is in this situation. Many of these people, however, are not yet comfortable
with or knowledgeable about cryptocurrencies. As they feel more comfortable,
a greater fraction of this wealth may move into cryptocurrencies, inflating the
market capitalization, perhaps to a few percent of the world’s GWP.
The second group, D, represents a government that is totalitarian, at least
with respect to monetary policy, so that its citizens are not free to transfer their
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wealth into other, more reliable national currencies. There is a probability, p,
that the government can initiate policies that will deprive citizens of a fraction
k of their wealth, e.g., by printing money. This possibility is noted by the
wealthy, W , who must make a decision on the fraction of their assets, denoted
1−x held in the home currency and the remainder, x, in cryptocurrency, which
presents risks of its own due to the volatility. The government, D, exhibits risk
aversion as with any financial entity. After all, its existence is dependent on
obtaining funds from its citizens. A third group, S, consists of the speculators2
whose sole reason to trade is to profit from the transaction at the expense of
the less knowledgeable group, W . In a typical situation, the a member of W
is trading for the first or second time – having made their money in another
endeavor – while the speculators are professionals who have made thousands of
trades, and make their living at the expense of novice traders. The speculators
effectively determine the volatility (see Appendix). Note, however, that our
analysis would be similar if the volatility were an exogenous variable that is set
arbitrarily. While D can set the probability, p, with which the assets can be
seized, groupW can decide what fraction, x, to convert into the cryptocurrency.
We model this situation to find equilibria in two different ways. The first
is to find the Nash equilibrium [28], [18], [29], [35], [13] which is defined as the
point (p∗, x∗) such that neither party can improve its fortunes by unilateral
action. The underlying assumption is that both parties, W and D, are aware of
the situation faced by the other, so that they can simultaneously self-optimize
while assuming that the other party does likewise.
In a later section, we utilize the more realistic assumption that while W
can make immediate changes (e.g., one day), D must make a decision that
is irrevocable during a longer time (e.g., one year) as policies (e.g., creating
inflation, imposing onerous taxes) are implemented. But in doing so, D must
be aware that W will self-optimize in its choice of x, knowing p. Thus, both
parties are aware of the different time scales involved in anticipating the other
party’s decision.
The methods we present in this paper are aimed at determining the demand
using optimization. The investors of the cryptocurrency do not have any clear
idea how much is the right amount to pay per unit of the cryptocurrency, so
that the demand will determine the trading price as discussed in Appendix A
and [9]. In a setting in which there is one cryptocurrency with a fixed supply,
the price will be determined as
Equilibrium Trading Price =
Demand in Dollars
Number of Units
. (1)
Analogous methodology can be utilized for multiple cryptocurrencies.
One might be led to examining cryptocurrencies in the context of mone-
tary policy, but the terminology ”currency” is the main similarity between the
2In commodities such as gold and oil, there are producers and industrial users who must
trade. In cryptocurrencies, there are no end users other than W who are trade infrequently,
unlike industrial users for gold, for example, who are perpetually trading.
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cryptocurrencies and the US Dollar, Euro, Yen, etc. The differences are pro-
found3. Major currencies are established by governments within a well-defined
process that is governed by law. The identities of those who are responsible
for monetary policy are known. The citizens of the country can influence the
representatives who appoint the monetary officials. Finally, if the citizens feel
that the direction of monetary policy is not in their interest, they can elect new
representatives. There have been many currencies throughout the world, and it
is no accident that the most viable currencies have been those of the countries
with the most respect for the law and the voices of their citizens.
Thus, the theory of monetary policy will be of limited use in the under-
standing today’s cryptocurrencies. The aspect of our analysis that is closest to
monetary policy involves the actions of the government, D, which must make
a decision on issues such as generating inflation (see, e.g., [2], [3]). Of course,
the government in our analysis is one that is very different from the major
democratic governments that have the more reliable currencies.
Since the widespread use of cryptocurrencies is a fairly new phenomenon,
the literature is also recent. Many papers have focussed on the blockchain
technology and its potential for increased speed and safety of transactions. The
introduction of JP Morgan’s JPM Coin (see Appendix A) is an example of
utilization of this technology without any new economic issues, since JPM Coin
would be redeemable in US Dollars. The economics ofcryptocurrencies have
been discussed in terms of legal issues [24], valuation [15], security issues [5],
[16] and stability [7], [23], [26] , [30] and feasibility [12]. Experiments have also
been used to study cryptocurrencies and related issues [14], [19].
Our analysis can be viewed in the more general setting of an asset that is
easily traded and out of the reach of the state and other entities. However,
the popularity of cryptocurrencies may indicate that there are not so many of
these. Traditionally, gold has been used as a haven, but it is not always easy to
prevent theft. Nevertheless, followers have often noted spikes in gold when there
is political uncertainty in the highly populated and less developed countries.
Also, the demand for gold depends upon other factors such as industrial use.
The Utility Functions of the Groups
The general framework for this section will be to write the utility functions
of the three groups, modeled on portfolio theory [27], [4] whereby one seeks
allocate resources to maximize return while minimizing risk. The general form
for a basic utility function is U = m−d2σ2 where m and σ2 are the expectation
and variance of the outcome, while the parameter d2 quantifies the risk aversion.
The speculators, S, are assumed to have an influence on the volatility and
risk. Even if they had no influence on the volatility, they are likely to profit at
the expense ofW , who are likely to be novices. Hence, the role of S is secondary
3This point is probably clear to anyone who bought Bitcoin at $20, 000 and sold it at
$6, 000 several months later.
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(and discussed in the Appendix) as they create an expected loss and a variance
for W .
Focusing now on the groups, W and D, we assume that W has a choice
between the home currency, F, and a cryptocurrency, Y. Any money held in F
faces the risk that a fixed fraction k ∈ [0, 1] will be seized by D with probability
p. Thus, the outcome will be (1− x) (1− k) with probability p and 1 with
probability 1 − p. Letting mF and σ
2
F denote the mean and variance of the
investment in F, one finds,
mF = (1− k) p+ 1 · (1− p) = 1− kp,
σ2F = k
2p (1− p) . (2)
For the investment in Y, we let mY and σ
2
Y denote the mean and variance that
will be determined by the speculators (see Appendix).
The utility function for W with the fraction x ∈ [0, 1] of its assets in Y and
the remainder in F can then be expressed as
UW = m− d
2σ2 (3)
= xmY + (1− x)mF
− d2
{
x2σ2Y + (1− x)
2 σ2F + 2x (1− x)Cov [Y, F ]
}
.
We will assume that the correlation between the two assets, Y and F, is zero,
but the analysis can easily be carried out if there is a correlation.
The utility function for D can be expressed in terms of the amount that it
seizes, i.e.,
UD = (1− x) kp. (4)
This can be augmented with a term (as in portfolio theory) that expresses the
risk aversion. In particular, one has
UD = (1− x) kp− d
2
Dp
2, (5)
where d2D represents the risk aversion of D.
Nash Equilibria
We assume the utility functions described in Section 3, using the risk aversion
form of UD above (5) . Thus, we need to find (p
∗, x∗) such that
∂xUW (p
∗, x∗) = 0, ∂pUD (p
∗, x∗) = 0,
∂xxUW (p
∗, x∗) ≤ 0, ∂ppUD (p
∗, x∗) ≤ 0 .
i.e., (p∗, x∗) satisfies the definition of a Nash equilibrium (see e.g., [28],). Briefly,
the definition ensures that at (p∗, x∗) neither party can unilaterally improve its
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situation. We compute
0 = ∂pUD (p, x) = (1− x) k − 2d
2
Dp, (6)
0 = ∂xUW (p, x) = mY −mF + 2d
2σ2F − 2d
2
(
σ2Y + σ
2
F
)
x
= mY − 1 + kp+ 2d
2k2p (1− p)− 2d2
(
σ2Y + k
2p (1− p)
)
x. (7)
Denote the solution of (6) by x1 (p) and that of (7) by x2 (p) , so that
x1 (p) = 1−
2d2Dp
k
(8)
x2 (p) =
σ2F +
(
2d2
)
−1
(mY −mF )
σ2F + σ
2
Y
=
k2p (1− p) +
(
2d2
)
−1
(mY − 1 + kp)
k2p (1− p) + σ2Y
. (9)
The intersection of x1 (p) and x2 (p) determine a Nash equilibrium. We first
establish sufficient conditions for at most one equilibrium, and then prove that
under broad conditions, there exists a Nash equilibrium. Some of these curves
for sample values of the parameters are illustrated in Figure 2 (see published
version for figures).
Theorem 1 For p ∈ [0, 1/2] one has x′
2
(p) ≥ 0 for all values of the parameters,
so there can be at most one value of p such that x1 (p) = x2 (p), and thus at
most one Nash equilibrium for p ∈ [0, 1/2].
Proof. For convenience set f (p) = k2p (1− p) , c1 =
(
2d2
)
−1
(1−mY ) , c2 =(
2d2
)
−1
k and c3 = σ
2
Y so that
x2 (p) =
f (p) + c2p− c1
f (p) + c3
and
x′
2
(p) =
c2k
2p2 + c2c3 + (c1 + c3) k
2 (1− 2p)
[f (p) + c3]
2
. (10)
Clearly, for p ∈ [0, 1/2] all terms are positive and the conclusion follows.
Theorem 2 If the parameters d, k and mY satisfy
c1 + c3 ≤ c2 i.e.,
(
1 + 2d2
)
(1−mY ) ≤ k (11)
then x′
2
(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1] . Thus there can be at most one Nash equilibrium
under these conditions.
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Proof. For p ∈ [0, 1/2] the result has been established. For p ∈ [1/2, 1] the
numerator of (10) is
c2k
2p2 + c2c3 + c2k
2 (1− 2p) = c2c3 + c2k
2 (1− p)
2
> 0,
and the result follows.
Having determined sufficient conditions for uniqueness, we now focus on es-
tablishing existence of Nash equilibrium. Note first that the p−intercept of
x1 (p) can be on either side of x = 1 depending on the slope −2d
2
D/k. In partic-
ular, we let pc := k
(
2d2D
)
−1
and consider the two cases separately.
Theorem 3 (a) If pc := k
(
2d2D
)
−1
< 1 and
k2pc (1− pc) +
(
2d2
)−1
(mY − 1 + pck) > 0, (12)
then one has a Nash equilibrium, i.e., there exists (p∗, x∗) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] such
that x1 (p
∗) = x2 (p
∗) = x∗.
(b) If pc := k
(
2d2D
)
−1
≥ 1 and(
2d2
)
−1
(mY − 1 + k)
σ2Y
+
2d2D
k
≥ 1
then one has again a Nash equilibrium.
If in addition, equation (11) holds, then the Nash equilibrium (p∗, x∗) is
unique.
Proof. Recall that mY ≤ 1. Thus, we have the inequality,
1 = x1 (0) > 0 ≥ x2 (0) = (mY − 1) /
(
2d2σ2Y
)
.
We use the Intermediate Value Theorem to establish an intersection between
x1 (p) and x2 (p) in the unit square in (p, x) space.
Case (a) . Suppose pc := k
(
2d2D
)
−1
< 1. Then
x2 (pc) =
k2pc (1− pc) +
(
2d2
)
−1
(mY − 1 + pck)
k2pc (1− pc) + σ2Y
so that by (12) one has x2 (pc) ≥ 0 = x1 (pc). Thus there exists an intersection
of x1 (p) and x2 (p) at (p
∗, x∗) ∈ [0, 0]× [pc, x (pc)] ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] .
Case (b) . Suppose pc := k
(
2d2D
)
−1
> 1. Then x1 (1) > 0, and x1 (p) ∈ [0, 1]
for p ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, an intersection of x1 (p) and x2 (p) for p ∈ [0, 1] must occur
on the unit square provided that x2 (1) ≥ x1 (1) . Then the required condition
is
x2 (1) =
(
2d2
)
−1
(mY − 1 + k)
σ2Y
≥ 1−
2d2D
k
= x1 (1) .
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Remark 4 The Nash equilibrium may not be unique if the condition above, i.e.,(
1 + 2d2
)
(1−mY ) ≤ k
of Theorem 3 is violated. An example for two Nash equilibria can be constructed
with the parameters:
k = 0.7, mY = 0.8, d = 2, dD = 0.355, σ
2
Y = 0.1.
The two equilibria are given approximately by (p∗, x∗) = (0.88, 0.68) and (0.96, 0.65),
as pictured in Figure 1.
Equilibrium with Disparate Time Scales
We consider the situation in which the wealthy, W , can decide on an allocation
x immediately, (e.g., within one day), and adjust to the probability, p, while
D must set p that cannot be changed for a long time e.g., one year. Thus, D
lacks the opportunity to react to the value of x. Both parties are aware of the
position of the other group. Hence, D knows that once he sets p, group W will
set x = xˆ (p) in a way that optimizes UW , and that W does not need to be
concerned with any readjustment of p in reaction to their choice of x. Thus, D
must examine UW (based on the publicly available information on the volatility
of Y) and decide on a value of p that will optimize UD (p, xˆ (p)) . Within this
setting the utility of D need not be strictly convex in order for an interior
maximum (i.e. such that 0 < p < 1 and 0 < x < 1). Thus, we consider the case
in which D has utility that is proportional to the amount it takes, without any
risk aversion, which can be included with a bit more calculation.
We define the quantity
A := 2d2σ2Y + 1−mY (13)
which arises naturally in the calculations and is a measure of the risk and ex-
pected loss from Y. Thus a higher value of A means Y is less attractive to the
wealthy.
Theorem 5 Suppose that the utility functions, UW and UD, given by
UD = (1− x) kp
UW = m− d
2σ2
= xmY + (1− x)mF
− d2
{
x2σ2Y + (1− x)
2
σ2F + 2x (1− x)Cov [Y, F ]
}
.
are known to both parties. Assume that D sets p irrevocably to maximize UD,
while W chooses x to maximize UW based on a knowledge of p. For 0 ≤ A < k
the optimal choice of x given p is
xˆ (p) :=
mY −mF
2d2 (σ2Y + σ
2
F )
+
σ2F
σ2Y + σ
2
F
(14)
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with mY and σ
2
F given by (2) , and the optimal value of p is given by
p∗ :=
σ2Y
k (k −A)
(√
1 +
A
σ2Y
(k −A)− 1
)
. (15)
Thus the optimal point is (p, x) = (p∗, xˆ (p∗)) . The value of maximum, x∗ =
xˆ (p) is 0 if the right hand side of (14) is negative, and 1 if the right hand side
exceeds 1.
Remark 6 Note that given p the optimal fraction of assets in the cryptocur-
rency is a sum of the relative variance of the home currency, i.e., σ2F as a
fraction of σ2Y +σ
2
F plus the difference in expected loss from the home currency,
i.e., 1 − mF minus the expected loss from the cryptocurrency, 1 − mY scaled
by a risk aversion factor. Thus the fraction invested in the cryptocurrency in-
creases as the expected loss and the variance of the home currency increases,
and conversely.
Remark 7 Note that one obtains an interior maximum with a linear utility
function for UD in this type of optimization, i.e., even though D is interested in
pure maximization of its revenue.
Proof. Using (3) we determine the maximum of UW for a fixed p, so that
0 = ∂xUW (p, x) = mY −mF + 2d
2σ2Y − 2d
2
(
σ2Y + σ
2
F
)
x.
Noting that ∂xxUW (p, x) = −2d
2
(
σ2Y + σ
2
F
)
< 0 we see that UD is maximized
by xˆ (p) given by (14) provided xˆ (p) ∈ [0, 1]. In the following two cases the
maximum is on the boundary:
mY −mF
2d2
+ σ2F < 0 implies xˆ (p) = 0,
mY −mF
2d2
+ σ2F > 1 implies xˆ (p) = 1.
Thus, xˆ (p) interpolates between 0 and 1 by favoring Y if the relative risk
of F (measured by σ2F
(
σ2Y + σ
2
F
)
−1
is large in comparison with the relatively
greater expected loss in Y (scaled by the sum of the variances).
In anticipation, D optimizes UD (p, x (p)) . We thus compute, with B := σ
2
Y ,
0 =
2d2
k
∂pUD (p, x (p)) = ∂p
Ap− kp2
B + k2p (1− p)
=
(A− 2kp)
[
B + k2p (1− p)
]
−
(
Ap− k2p
) [
k2 (1− 2p)
]
[B + k2p (1− p)]
2
.
This identity is equivalent to
Q (p) := AB − 2Bkp+ k2 (A− k) p2 = 0. (16)
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Note that A > 0 by assumption. The positive root of equation (16) is
p∗ =
B
k (k −A)
(√
1 +
A
B
(k −A)− 1
)
.
One can verify that p∗ ∈ [0, 1], and conclude that (p∗, x∗) = (p∗, xˆ (p∗)) is the
optimal point.
Remark 8 Case A = 0. By definition (13) we see that 1 −mY = 0. Note that
p∗ = 0 follows from the identity above. Using the definition and the computed
values of mF = 1− kp and σ
2
F = k
2p (1− p) we write
xˆ (p) =
mY − 1 + kp
2d2 (σ2Y + k
2p (1− p))
+
k2p (1− p)
σ2Y + k
2p (1− p)
xˆ (0) =
mY − 1
2d2σ2Y
= 0.
In other words, when A = 0 there is no risk and no expected loss in the cryptocur-
rency. Thus, D realizes that any nonzero value of p will result in W investing
nothing in the home currency, F.
Case A = k. The quadratic numerator (16) is then Q (p) = AB − 2Bkp so
that one has p∗ = 1/2.
Case k < A ≤ 2k. By considering a small positive perturbation, δ, of A we
see that Q
(
1
2
)
> 0 so that the positive region of ∂pUD is extended toward the
right as A increases.
Case A ≥ 2k. Since p ≤ 1 one has
Q (p) ≥ B (A− 2k) + k2p2 (A− k) > 0,
so ∂pUD > 0 and the maximum is thus p
∗ = 1.
Conclusion
We have examined the optimal strategies for the key parties (those with savings
at risk, a dictatorial government and speculators) involved explicitly or implic-
itly in the formation of an equilibrium for cryptocurrencies. The second method
involves different time scales in determining equilbrium that differs from the
more common Nash equilibrium, in which all parties can readjust their positions
continuously. As described in Section 4 this can be utilized for many realistic
situations in which one entity such as a government optimizes by placing con-
ditions such as taxes, tariffs, fees, etc., or policies that cannot be reversed or
adjusted in a short time. In general, optimization in this form favors the group
that can make immediate and continuous adjustments.
Each of the methods are based on parameters that can be estimated. For
example, the variance of cryptocurrencies can be determined from the trading
data. Parameters such as k (the fraction of assets seized) can be estimated
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from the policies of the government. An assessment of these quantities then
leads to estimates of the amount of money that is likely to be used to purchase
cryptocurrencies in the aggregate. Using the ideas summarized in [9] one can
then also evaluate average price changes of cryptocurrencies as well as the total
market capitalization of cryptocurrencies. The evolution of the latter is crucial
in understanding the implications of instability of cryptocurrencies on other
sectors of the world’s economy.
Major governments have often appeared confused and lethargic in their re-
sponse to cryptocurrency policy, even insofar as deciding whether it is impor-
tant or not. There is also little understanding of the conditions under which a
cryptocurrency could be either beneficial or detrimental to global society. The
perspective of our paper suggests that a cryptocurrency price will vary widely
depending on the demand that in turn is based on policies of countries where
monetary policy and laws, in general are less developed. Together with the
fact that cryptocurrencies cannot be redeemed for any asset, one cannot ex-
pect much stability. However, given a mechanism whereby a cryptocurrency is
essentially backed by real assets (e.g., a structure similar to Exchange Traded
Funds) one would have stability since arbitrageurs would take advantage of any
discrepanicies. This could be linked of course to a single currency such as the
US Dollar, but would only be a trading token in this case.
However, one can design a cryptocurrency that would essentially grow with
the world’s economy, unlike a commodity such as gold. A simple example would
be that the cryptocurrency could be reedemable in units of the Gross World
Product in terms of a basket of major currencies, so that each cryptocurrency
could be redeemed for one trillionth of the GWP in Dollars, Euros and Yen.
Such an instrument would offer much greater stability and could be used as a
substitute currency that is independent of any government. As shown in our
analysis, as the volatility risk would diminish, and those whose assets in the
home currency are at risk would place more of their assets into this cryptocur-
rency. Thus the fraction, x, placed in the cryptocurrency would increase. In
particular, the equilibrium point (p∗, x∗) would feature x∗ that is larger and
p∗ that is smaller. This would mean that the citizens have greater economic
freedom, and financially totalitarian regimes would have smaller resources. In
summary, the creation of a viable cryptocurrency with intrinsic value would
have less volatility, and thereby reduce the fraction of savings in the home cur-
rency that is under threat by a totalitarian government, whose existence is often
contingent on raising money in this manner.
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Appendix A: Fundamental Value and Liquidity
Value
There is a temptation to stipulate that the only valuation of an asset is the
trading price, as this price reflects the preferences and values of the buyers and
sellers via the intersection of the supply and demand curves. In principle there
is nothing wrong with this perspective except that important phenomena are
left unexplained, and significant risks are mischaracterized as rare or low risk.
One way to examine different aspects of price or value is through the lab-
oratory experiments such as the ”bubbles” experiments introduced by [36] in
which an asset pays a dividend with expectation 24 cents at the end of each of
15 periods, and is then worthless. The value of this asset at the end of Period
k is clearly given in dollars by
Pa := 3.60− (0.24)k. (17)
In numerous experiments, prices often started well below (17) and soared far
above this fundamental value, and eventually crashed. This persisted even in
experiments in which the dividend payout had no randomness at all [31]. It
seems difficult to deny that Pa is a meaningful and useful quantity, particularly
since it is a quantity that the trader can be assured of receiving. For example,
purchasing at a trading price early in the experiment that is often below Pa
ensures the trader will gain a specific profit. If one ignores the intrinsic value,
Pa, one would conclude that the risk is the same at any price, and likely incur
a large loss during the course of the experiment. Also, it has been noted [8],
that in these experiments, there is a third quantity with units of price per share.
This is the ”liquidity value,” L, defined as the ratio of the sum of all cash in the
experiment divided by the total of all shares. Experiments that were designed
to test this concept [10, 11] showed that the liquidity value has a primary role in
determining the size of the bubble. In fact the peak of the bubble was often close
to L. In other words, when traders pay little attention to fundamental value, or
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if the fundamental value is not clear, the price drifts toward the liquidity value
[8]. At the opposite extreme, for short term government bonds, the calculation
of fundamental value is clear, as the owner is assured of a particular sum at a
particular time a few months in the future. The trading price generally trades
very close to this fundamental value since there are many arbitrageurs who
exploit any deviations.
The vast majority of cryptocurrencies do not have any redemption value,
they pay no dividends, and they do not endow holders with voting power over
an entity with assets (as do stocks, for example). Thus, classical finance cal-
culations involving expected dividends, book value, replacement value, etc., all
yield a fundamental value of zero. One exception is JP Morgan’s JPM Coin,
announced in February 2019 which would be redeemable in US dollars. The
redemption price would yield the guaranteed value, which would be Pa, the
fundamental value, so long as the investors are confident in JP Morgan’s ability
to fulfil its commitment.
Ignoring fundamental or intrinsic value often leads to disastrous practical
results, as investors discovered with the internet stocks in 1999, or the Japanese
market in 1990, for example, when standard calculations of stock value [21, 22]
showed a large discrepancy between the trading price and the fundamental value.
Similarly, in theoretical development, neglecting either the fundamental value,
Pa, or the liquidity value, L, will have the same consequences as overlooking any
other important quantity in modeling economics problems. One obtains some
results that are not consistent with observations, and has no way to rectify the
situation.
Although one cannot calculate a positive Pa for the typical cryptocurrency,
people are paying for these units, so that they must see some value in it. The
perspective that fundamental value must be the trading price, renders the equiv-
alence a tautology. As discussed above, the result is that important phenomena
are left unexplained, and an even a basic understanding of the likely price evo-
lution becomes more difficult.
Since cryptocurrencies have no fundamental value, prices will naturally drift
toward the liquidity value, which will be given by the total amount of cash
available for the cryptocurrency (i.e., demand) divided by the number of units
[10, 11].
The absence of a non-zero fundamental value means that price will be set
by the supply (which is fixed, for example, for Bitcoin) and demand in ac-
cordance with equation (1). Thus it is a calculation of demand that is key to
understanding equilibrium price.
Appendix B
1. We consider first the role of ”pure” speculators who have no control of
the type of trading or auction, the rules of the exchange, the enforcement of
the rules, the display of orders, and the flow of information. Volatility arises
endogenously due to the various trading strategies, such as trend following, and
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random events that motivate any of the traders. For many first time or novice
traders, there is a tendency to overreact, and to chase a trend, or hop onto a
fad. In the case of cryptocurrencies, which lack any fundamental value, any
news is likely to result in an overreaction. Thus volatility can be expected
to be high in the absence of any anchor. For example, Treasury bills offer
a guaranteed payout, so that a small deviation from the certain payout due
within a few months would be exploited by arbitrageurs and the price would
be restored close to its intrinsic value. The speculators in many markets have
a better understanding (compared to novice traders) of the factors that move
prices within a short time scale. Speculators are generally believed to lower
volatility [6], as they use their capital to buy when prices move unjustifyably
lower. Of course, when prices exhibit very low volatility, there is no financial
incentive for speculators to trade. Consequently, in an idealized setting, the
short-term volatility level will be established as the minimum value at which
speculators find adequate profits after costs.
2. Next we consider ”speculators” in less established markets in which the
rule makers, market makers, news makers are all essentially the same group.
In most developed markets such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
major commodity exchanges there are precise rules designed to promote fairness
and ease of trading that have been developed over many years. An example is
the NYSE rule that if there are two orders to purchase a stock, it is the higher
one that prevails. Surprisingly to novice traders, this is not usually a feature
of most markets. In many markets there are ”market makers” who are entitled
to buy the stock for their own account at a lower price, even though a higher
bid has been placed by a retail customer or trader. The rules of each exchange
endow the market makers and market specialists with the power to buy and sell
on their own account. In many well-developed exchanges, there are rules agains
”front-running” whereby insiders buy on their own accounts as they become
aware of a set of large orders that are entering the market. Another example
on major exchanges involves ”not held” trades that are placed with the market
makers but are not displayed. The intention here is that a large order to sell
could prompt further selling by less informed traders. By contrast, in a less
developed market environment, a market insider can place a large order (but
above the market price) that will immediately lead to lower prices, whereupon
he can deftly purchase.
Novice traders usually make numerous assumptions relating to fairness on
the nature of market rules and procedures. Unfortunately, these are generally
false for less developed markets that cater to inexperienced traders. The wishful
thinking of new traders seeking quick riches (or escape from a currency) provides
for a healthy income for those dominating these markets in terms of making the
rules (if there are any at all) and using their capital to control the volatility. For
many of the cryptocurrencies, for example, it is not even clear what the rules
are, or where they would be enforced. Thus, in an under-developed market, a
group of participants that controls the rules of trading has numerous tools at its
disposal to adjust volatility. Even the hours of trading have a strong impact on
17
volatility. For example, it is well-known that trading around the clock leads to
times periods of low volume so that a few trades can move prices much more than
during actively traded times. On the other hand, in an exchange in which there
is a single trade each day at a specified time, the maximum minus minimum
price within one week is likely to be much lower than in 24 hour trading.
Another feature that can influence prices is the extent to which information
on orders is displayed. The ”order book” displays the array of bids and asks
for the asset in continuous time. Whether or not the order book is displayed
depends upon the rules of the exchange. Also, on some exchanges, the market
maker can choose to display only some of the orders. In laboratory experiments
[11] it was shown that bubbles are tempered by the display of the complete
order book.
Related to the order book are the rules under which the market maker can
buy for his own account. While ”front running” – the practice of buying for one’s
own account ahead of a large order – or ”shadowing” – buying the same assets
as a particular trader – are banned in some of the most developed exchanges,
one cannot assume that they will be prohibited universally.
Of course, all of this assumes that there is a real market in which bids and
asks are matched with some rule. In many cases purchases and sales are made
through one entity that buys and sells for its own account, thereby granting itself
a generous profit as the middleman. Even in large brokerages it is common for
monthly statements to disclose ”we make a market in this stock” that indicates
the bid/ask spread is whatever the company designates as revenue for itself.
From the perspective of the individual trader, the bid/ask spread, of course,
adds to the cost and volatility of the transaction.
Appendix C
In examining the choice faced by W we assume that one option is to remain
in the home currency, F, and the other to buy the cryptocurrency with the
objective of later selling in order to buy other assets such as a more reliable
currency, gold, etc.
The groupW experiences a loss or gain on these transactions with the spec-
ulators, group S, which itself has a non-linear utility function reflecting that
fact that high volatility is good for profits up to a point after which it has a
negative impact. Thus, one has the following utility function for group S:
US = a1V − a2V
2
where V represents the volatility or variance, for example, and a1, a2 are positive
constants. Hence, there will be a maximum value V = Vm that maximizes the
utility of the speculators. This can be viewed as a fixed quantity from the
perspective of W .
The mean, mY , and variance, σ
2
Y of group W ’s investments in Y can be
calculated based on Vm and the other parameters that describe the trading.
In particular, we assume that there is a probability q (presumably small) that
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W will profit, and that their wealth will increase from 1 to 1 + r1Vm and a
probability 1 − q that it will decrease from 1 to 1 − r2Vm where r2 > r1 > 0.
In other words, there is a small probabilty, q, that W will benefit by r1Vm (as
a fraction of their original wealth) and a larger probability, 1 − q, that they
will lose a larger sum r2Vm . The loss is proportional to the volatility as the
professional speculators are able to exploit the ups and downs of the trading at
the expense of the inexperienced W .
The mean and variance of the outcome are then
mY = q (1 + r1Vm) + (1− q) (1− r2Vm) ,
σ2Y = q (1− q) (r1 + r2)Vm.
In other words, there is large probability thatW will take a loss on the transac-
tion. One can consider more general probability distributions forW ’s profits and
losses, but ultimately, the two quantities that are relevant for its utility function
UW are given by mY and σ
2
Y that one can regard as empirical observables.
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